This paper addresses the problem of ranking growth episodes from a microeconomic perspective. While most of the existing criteria, framed in the pro-poor growth tradition, are either based on anonymous individuals or use to identify them on the base of their status in the initial period, this paper proposes new criteria to evaluate growth, which are robust to the choice of the reference period used to identify individuals. Suitable dominance conditions that can be used to rank alternative growth processes are derived by means of an axiomatic approach. Moreover, the theoretical results are used to rank the different growth episodes that took place in the last decade in Australia, Germany, Korea, Switzerland, and US.
Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Kuznets (1955) , the analysis of the distributional implications of growth has become one of the most prominent topics in economics. However, the impressive number of contributions that soon followed were not able to reach a unanimous consensus on the effects of growth on the distribution. The scarcity of reliable data and the use of aggregate indicators of the distribution and its dynamics were among the main reasons for this lack of consensus (see Ferreira, 2010) . After a period of reticence, this issue is now living a renewed and increasing interest among scientists and policymakers. The availability of better survey data has spurred the scientific community to adopt a different perspective to this analysis. There is, in fact, an increasing awareness in the recent literature that individuals, rather than a representative aggregate of the whole population, should be the focus of analysis for evaluating the impact of growth (see, among others, Benjamin et al., 2011; Ravallion, 1998 Ravallion, , 2012 Ravallion and Chen, 2007) . Moreover, this aspect of growth is at center stage also in the political agenda at an international level: for instance, one of the targets of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), that from the end of 2015 will replace the Millennium Development Goals, is to promote 'inclusive economic growth', that is growth that benefits all the segments of society.
Hence, as a response to the original macroeconomic approach, two alternative microeconomic approaches have been developed to evaluate growth and its distributional implications. The first is the disaggregated anonymous approach, which evaluates growth processes on the basis of the income change experienced by each part of the distribution (see, among others, Essama-Nssah, 2005; Ravallion and Chen, 2003; Son, 2004) . Its main tool is the Growth Incidence Curve (GIC, Ravallion and Chen, 2003) , plotting against each percentile of the distribution the mean income change of that percentile. This approach has however been recently criticized since, due to its anonymity properties, incomes of different individuals are used to compute the percentile specific growth, as those that are at a particular percentile in the initial income distribution are not necessarily at that same percentile in the second period income distribution. Measures of anonymous growth, thus, fail to capture the impact of re-ranking or mobility taking place during the overall growth process. This procedure can be satisfactory if the aim is the understanding of the pure cross-section impact of growth. In can be however undesirable if the aim is a more normative and intertemporal evaluation of growth.
In order to overcome this issue, a non-anonymous approach has been recently proposed, which relaxes the anonymity assumption and evaluates growth processes on the basis of individuals' growth is also called history dependent. The related frameworks usually give more weight to the growth experienced by the initially poor than to that experienced by the initially rich individuals.
In this article, we share this view and we believe that, for the welfare evaluation of growth, the status of individuals do matter. This information allows to find out who are the winners and losers from growth, a useful information, for example, in the evaluation of the efficacy of policy reforms, usually hidden by the anonymity assumption in the standard anonymous approach.
However, the existing literature has developed dominance conditions in which the identification of the individuals is exclusively based on their position in the income distribution of the first period (see in particular, Bourguignon, 2011; Palmisano and Peragine, 2015; Van Kerm, 2009 ). This choice, though perfectly legitimate, is not the only possible and is not supported by any normative grounded reason. Nevertheless, the choice of the reference period can have an impact on the result of a given comparison between countries or between growth episodes for the same countries. In other words, it is questionable, in the social evaluation of growth, to give priority only to the growth of the initially poor individuals, as compared to the initially rich, and not, for instance, to the growth of the finally poor individuals as compared to the finally rich.
Note that, in such frameworks, the attention on the poorer individuals in the final period also finds its justification in the sphere of public interventions that should, in general, target this group of the population. In fact, in terms of priority in public interventions (such as anti-poverty policies), it may be more meaningful to give relevance to the new poor rather than to those individuals who exited from poverty.
The considerations above are even more impelling when the evaluation of the distributional effect of growth concerns growth processes that take place over a long period or even over the full life span. In this case, the choice of the first period distribution as the reference distribution can be justified by the belief that low income earlier in life may impact the standards of living later in life but not the other way around. However, it does not imply that this belief will be universally accepted. There can be arguments in favor of the opposite belief, that is living with a low level of income may matter more the closer an individual is to the end of his/her life (see on this Hoy and Zheng, 2011).
In order to address this issue, this paper proposes a more general framework for the normative assessment and comparison of growth processes: within this normative framework, we are able to obtain dominance conditions that are robust with respect to the choice of the reference period used to identify individuals.
More in particular, we propose a social evaluation function (SEF) in which the status of the individuals both in the initial and in the final period can be used to evaluate growth. We, then, introduce desirable properties that allow to consider classes of this SEF, within which the two periods equally affect the social evaluation of growth, and classes of this SEF within which the first period status matters more or less than the final period status. By demanding for unanimity within these classes, we obtain distributional criteria to rank growth processes that result to be robust to the choice of the reference period used to identify individuals.
Hence, we provide new partial orderings for ranking growth processes, that are based on the concept of upward dominance for continuous distribution and upward and downward dominance for discrete distributions. Thus, our framework represents an additional instrument in the researcher's toolbox to help apprehending the distributional effects of growth, in particular when there is interest in making comparisons of growth between two (or more) populations or over time.
Last, note that our framework is also coherent with that part of the economic literature, mostly focused on happiness studies, in which increasing evidence is provided showing that individual wellbeing strictly depends on their income relative to that of the others (see on this Clark et al., 2008) .
In fact, in our framework the evaluation of a person's income growth implicitly depends on the incomes of other individuals in the population.
We, then, adopt this theoretical framework to compare the distributional impact of growth in five different countries, namely Australia, Germany, Korea, Switzerland, and US, in the last decade.
We do this using the Cross National Equivalent File (CNEF), a dataset containing harmonized data on these countries. We find that Australia, followed by Korea, arises to be the best performing country, that is its growth process, evaluated when both initial and final period status matter, results to be the dominating process in the largest number of pairwise comparisons. Whereas, Germany and Switzerland arise to be the worst performing, that is, their growth processes results to be the dominated one in most of the pairwise comparisons considered.
Our results also show that it does make a difference in the ranking of countries whether one is concerned with the initial status of individuals or with their status in the final distribution. Thus it shows the relevance of adopting our generalized framework, which is able to provide additional information for the comparison of different growth processes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the models used in the microeconomic-oriented literature on the distributional effect of growth and proposes the new framework. Section 3 provides the empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes.
Evaluating patterns of income growth
In this section we outline the set up and the standard tools used to assess alternative growth patterns. We then introduce our approach based on an extended concept of non-anonymity, that is robust to the choice of the reference period.
Standard practices
Let a society's income distribution be represented by the cumulative distribution function (cdf )
In a given period of time t, F (y t ) = P (ỹ t ∈ + :ỹ t ≤ y t ), that is the cdf returns the probability p ∈ [0, 1] of observing income less or equal toỹ t in that society in period t. The mean income of this society is denoted by µ(y t ). Let the inverse of this cdf be denoted by y t (p t ), where y t (p t ) = inf {y t ∈ + |F (y t ) ≥ p t }; hence, y t (p t ) : [0, 1] → + represents the income of the person whose rank in the distribution F (y t ) is p t . p t then represents the status of the individual in t. We deal with a total number of periods equal to 2, with t = 1 representing the pre-growth period, while t + 1 = 2 representing the post-growth period, hence t ∈ {1, 2}.
The standard anonymous practice to evaluate and compare the distributive performance of two growth processes consists in comparing their respective GICs and cumulative GICs. The GIC is formally defined as follows (Ravallion and Chen, 2003) :
where L (p) is the first derivative of the Lorenz curve at percentile p, and γ = µ (y t+1 ) /µ (y t ) − 1 is the overall mean income growth rate. The GIC plots the percentile specific rate of income growth in a given period of time. Clearly, g (p) ≥ 0 (g (p) < 0) indicates a positive (negative) growth at p. A downward sloping GIC indicates that growth contributes to equalize the distribution of income (i.e.
g (p) decreases as p increases), whereas an upward sloping GIC indicates a non-equalizing growth (i.e. g (p) increases as p increases). When the GIC is an horizontal line, inequality does not change over time and the rate of growth experienced by each quantile is equal to the rate of growth in the overall mean income.
Given two growth processes A and B, dominance of A over B is verified when the GIC of the former lies nowhere below that of the latter, in which case it is possible to state that under A all income percentiles have been growing more (or decreasing less) than under B. A dominance of the second order of A over B is verified when the cumulative GIC of the former lies nowhere below that of the latter, implying that A has been more progressive than B.
These criteria are based on the comparison of each income percentile at two different points in time. Therefore, although based on individual data, this procedure ignores the individuals' identity and does not allow to trace their income dynamic. It is then necessary to resort to the nonanonymous versions of the GIC, namely the na-GIC and cumulative na-GIC, in order to address this issue. Letting y t+1 (p t ) be the final period income of an individual ranked p t in the initial period, the na-GIC can be formally defined as follows (Bourguignon, 2011; Grimm, 2007; Van Kerm, 2009 ):
In other words, the na-GIC associates to every quantile of the initial distribution the mean income growth of all individual units in that quantile. A major drawback of these frameworks, however, is their dependency on the first period distribution, as they are sensitive to the status of individual in the initial period but not to the status of individuals in the final period (unless no reranking takes place). Although the choice of the first period as the reference period to identify individuals is usually considered to be a natural choice, it still remains a purely arbitrary modeling choice. As discussed in the first section, different considerations do motivate a generalization of these frameworks to allow for a more flexible assessment of the distributional impact of growth. We do this in the following section.
The model
Our aim is to evaluate and compare growth processes according to an extended non-anonymous perspective. Therefore, we need to keep track of the status of individuals in both periods, where such status is represented by the rank of individuals in the initial and final distribution of income.
For this reason, we denote by δ(p t ) the income change in moving from date t to t + 1, for a given individual ranked p in the initial period and by δ(p t+1 ) the income change in moving from date t to t + 1, for a given individual ranked p in the final period.
We denote by G (t,t+1) the growth process taking place between t and t + 1 and by D the set of the base of the arguments outlined so far, we propose that social preferences over growth processes can be represented by the following social evaluation function, which is a generalization of the rank dependent SEF proposed by Yaari: (1988)
or equivalentlyŴ v(p t )δ(p t )dp t , is a weighted sum of the income change experienced by the individuals that are identified according to their status in the initial period; the second component, Note that δ(p t ) can be expressed through a variety of measures of individual income growth, including the absolute income change or the proportionate income change.
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That is, in order to evaluate growth, one needs to aggregate the income change experienced by each individual, using rank-specific weighting functions. Different preferences over growth processes can be expressible through our model imposing different restrictions on the social weights, hence selecting different classes of weight profiles. These, in turn, define different classes of social evaluation functions (SEF).
The first restriction we impose reflects a standard monotonicity assumption.
Property 1 (Pro-growth). v(p t ) ≥ 0 for all p t ∈ [0, 1] and for all t = 1, 2.
It implies that, all else equal, a positive income growth will not decrease social welfare, whereas a negative growth will not increase social welfare. Negative and positive growth both in absolute and relative terms are equally valued, that is they are symmetric. An individual ranked p and gaining δ will result in an increase of the SWF equal to v * δ while a reduction of δ will results in a reduction of the SWF equal to v * δ, so the impact will be equal to v * δ but in the opposite direction.
The second property we consider makes our social evaluation function distribution-sensitive. An income reduction decreases more the social evaluation of growth the poorer is the individual in the initial (final) distribution. In the same vain, an income increase brings more additional welfare the poorer in the initial (final) distribution is the individual experiencing that increase.
Note that Property 1 and 2 capture the main core of our paper as they endorse an agnostic view with respect to the choice of the reference period. In fact, in previous contributions they have been imposed only with respect to v(p t ) for t = 1 while letting implicitly v(p t+1 ) = 0. Here, instead, we require that they also hold for t = 2.
In such a framework, an hypothetical The next two properties allow for situations in which a social planner would either prefer the initial period status to the final one or the other way round.
Property 3 (Preference for initial period
Property 3 reflects the idea that the status of individuals in the first period matters more than in the second period. In other words, a social planner would give more relevance to the growth of poor (rich) individuals in the initial period than to the growth of who is poor (rich) in the final period. The following property reflects the opposite argument.
Property 4 (Preference for final period
According to Property 4, the social evaluation of growth would be more sensitive to the growth experienced by those poor (rich) individuals in the final period than those who are poor (rich) in the initial period. Given that we are not imposing strict inequality, both Property 3 and 4 encompass the special case in which the social evaluation of growth is equally sensitive to the individual's status in the initial and final periods. That is, the growth of the poor (rich) individuals in the initial period affects the social evaluation of growth in the same measure as the growth experienced by the poor (rich) individuals in the final period.
The following families of social evaluation functions can be identified on the base on the properties introduced above: Ŵ 1 is the class of SEFs constructed as in (4) 
Results
We now turn to identify a range of conditions to be satisfied for ensuring the dominance of one growth process over the other in terms of extended non-anonymous evaluation, for the different families of social evaluation functionsŴ listed above. All the proofs are gathered in the Theoretical Appendix.
We start considering the class of social evaluation functionsŴ 1 , for which the following result holds.
Proposition 1 Given two alternative growth processes, G
and
Proposition 1 characterizes two dominance conditions of the first order. The first condition requires that the distribution of individuals' income change of growth process A, must lie nowhere below that of B, for all the initial social statuses (or initial income ranks). The second condition requires that the distribution of individuals' income change of growth process A, must lie nowhere below that of B, for all the final social statuses (or final income ranks). Hence, when we only impose pro-growth, to determine which growth process is socially preferable we need to check that for each rank of the initial and final period the growth experienced is higher in A than in B.
Proposition 1 encompasses some interesting special cases. They are summarized in the following Corollary 1 and 2.
Corollary 1 Given two alternative growth processes,
Corollary 2 Given two alternative growth processes, This class of social evaluation functions is the expression of a simple efficiency-based criterion;
no concern is expressed in terms of redistributional effects of growth. The next Proposition deals with this issue.
Proposition 2 Given two alternative growth processes,
, ∀Ŵ ∈ W 1,2 , if and only if
Two conditions of the second order are characterized by this Proposition. According to the first condition, we have to order increasingly individuals on the base of their rank in the initial distribution and check that the cumulated sum of their income change be higher in A than in B.
According to the second condition, we have to order increasingly individuals on the base of their rank in the final distribution and check that the cumulated sum of their income change be higher in A than in B. If both conditions are satisfied, under the dominating process initially poor individuals gain more (or lose less) than initially rich and finally poor individuals gain more (or lose less) than finally rich.
As expected, also Proposition 2 encompasses some special cases that are worth observing; they are presented in Corollary 3 and 4.
Corollary 3 Given two alternative growth processes,
Corollary 4 Given two alternative growth processes, 
Proposition 3 Given two growth processes
Proposition 3 characterizes a sequential dominance condition of the first order. In fact, (i) is the first step of this sequential dominance and requires that growth be higher in A than in B at all ranks of the initial distribution, that is at all p t . In other words, this first step is equivalent to the test characterized in Proposition 1. Condition (ii) is the second and, in this specific case, the last step of this sequential dominance, given that t ∈ {1, 2}. It requires that the cumulated growth between the initial and final period is higher in A than in B for all ranks p ∈ [0, 1]. In order to perform this test, we have to merge the distribution of income change with individuals ordered on the base of the initial income to that of income change with individuals ordered on the base of the initial income. The margin takes place by summing the growth of the individual ranked p in the initial period to the growth of individuals ranked p in the final period. We then have to check that the sum of the growth of individuals ranked p in t and the growth of individuals ranked p in t + 1 is higher in A than in B and this dominance must be checked at every p ∈ [0, 1]. Note that while ab (1987) characterize a first order direct sequential dominance requiring a comparison of the weighted averages of distributions functions, aggregated at every level of income, we require the comparison of inverse distributions, where the aggregation take place at every percentile as a result of the application of the rank-dependent model.
Proposition 4 Given two growth processes
), ∀Ŵ ∈ W 1,4 , if and only if
Proposition 4 characterizes a 'downward' sequential dominance condition of the first order.
is the first step of this sequential dominance and requires that growth be higher in A than in B at all ranks of the final distribution.
(ii) is the second and last step of this sequential dominance.
As before, in order to perform this test, we have to merge the distribution of income change with individuals ordered on the base of the initial income to that of income change with individuals ordered on the base of the initial income. The margin takes place by summing the growth of the individual ranked p in the initial period to the growth of individuals ranked p in the final period.
We then have to check that the sum of the growth of individuals ranked p in t and the growth of individuals ranked p in t + 1 is higher in A than in B and this dominance must be checked at we have to check that growth is higher in A than in B, for each aggregated rank-specific growth.
It is clear the difference between Proposition 3 and 4. According to the former, the dominance of A over B is checked starting from a distribution of income change in which individuals are ordered on the base of the first period rank, whereas, according to the latter, we have to start from a distribution of income change in which individuals are ordered on the base of the final period rank.
Aggregate measures
The ordering of growth patterns that can be obtained using the dominance criteria proposed previously are robust but only partial. Complete rankings, instead, can be generated by specifying a specific functional form to impose on the social weights v(p t ) and thus adopting a scalar measure.
This will be particularly helpful when the framework introduced above fails to generate a ranking so leading to inconclusive results.
For this reason, we introduce three aggregate measures of growth. We do this by considering social evaluation functions endorsing a preference for monotonicity and pro-poorness of growth, hence satisfying axioms 1 and s. Hence, assuming that we give equal relevance to the ranking of individuals in both initial and final period, such index can be expressed as follows:
Our index of history dependent growth attaches to each gi a weight that is decreasing in the The second family we wish to introduce can be used when proposition 3 is not able to guarantee a ranking. Hence, when we are in front of a social planner that regrets income reductions from one period to the other and that cares more about the ranking of individuals in the initial period, an aggregate index that gives as complete ranking can be expressed as follows:
The third and last family we consider is consistent with Proposition 4. Hence, when we are in front of a social planner that regrets income reductions from one period to the other and that cares more about the ranking of individuals in the final period, an aggregate index that gives as complete ranking can be expressed as follows:
Empirical application
In this Section we implement our theoretical framework in order to analyze the growth process experienced by five different countries in the last decade. for US. In order to identify individuals we partition the initial and final distributions of income into 50 quantiles. We use sample weights to compute all estimates with standard errors obtained through 500 bootstrap replications. 
Results
We now apply the dominance tests presented in Section 2. The results are obtained through pairwise comparisons of the countries analyzed. We start from Proposition 1, where only the size of growth and its direction (positive vs. negative growth) matter.
7 Table 1 shows that, although the conditions imposed in this proposition are quite strongit requires a first order dominance of the income change experienced by each individual, where individuals are independently ordered on the base of the first period position in the income ladder and of the second period position -some of the processes can already be ranked. In particular, when relative growth matters, the growth process that took place in Korea dominates those that took place in US, Germany, and Switzerland. The last two processes are also dominated by that of Australia. When absolute growth is concerned, inconclusiveness increases and we are only able to prove that the Australian growth episode dominates the German and the Swiss one. The remaining comparisons produce ambiguous results.
We now consider the test proposed in Proposition 2, endorsing the view that priority should be given to the growth experienced by those individuals initially/finally ranked lowest as compared to the growth experienced by those initially/finally ranked highest. Now, when the focus is on 6 See the Empirical Appendix for more details. 7 For the sake of brevity, the detailed results for condition (i) and (ii) are reported in the Empirical Appendix. Note: anonymity is expressed with respect to initial period status (panels on the left) and to final period status (panels on the right). Source: author' elaboration based on CNEF. relative growth, imposing more restrictions on the social weight helps to increase our ability to rank countries in one more case. This is Australia, whose growth process now dominates that of US. When the focus is on absolute growth, inconclusiveness reduces more. We are able to obtain a ranking in two more cases and they all concern Australia: it ranks the best in all the comparisons executed. Thus, when both the size and the redistributive effect of growth matters, Australia turns out to be the best performing country in terms of (initial and final) non-anonymous growth; whereas the other comparisons produce incomplete results.
We finally perform the tests proposed in Proposition 3 and 4. They account for the possibility that the social planner would either prefer the initial period status to the final one (Proposition 3) or the other way round (Proposition 4).
The results of Proposition 3 are reported in Table 3 , while those of Proposition 4 are reported in Table 4 . Proposition 3 confirms the results found testing Proposition 1. That is, when growth is measured in relative terms the growth taking place in Australia dominates the growth taking place in Germany and Switzerland, while the growth of Korea dominates the growth of Germany, Switzerland and US. As for absolute growth, the only dominance found is between Australia and Germany and Australia and Switzerland. Proposition 4, instead, confirms the results of Proposition 1 only when we deal with relative growth. When we look at absolute growth we obtain, in addition to the dominance find in Proposition 1, the dominance of Korea over Germany and Switzerland.
Overall it is possible to state that, among the five countries considered, Australia -followed by Korea -arises to be the best performing country, while Germany and Switzerland are the worst performers, both when size and distributional aspects matter in the growth judgment procedure.
Last, it is important to notice that it does make a difference in the ranking of countries whether one is more concerned with (has more preferences towards) the initial status of individuals than to the status on individuals in the final distribution, or the other way round. Note, in fact, that when the focus is on relative growth, conditions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 2 provide a different result for the ranking of countries (see Table 7 and 8 in the Empirical Appendix). In particular, when only Note: anonymity is expressed with respect to initial period status (panels on the left) and to final period status (panels on the right). Source: author' elaboration based on CNEF. 
Germany Korea Switzerland
Note: ≥ (≤) indicates that the first distribution dominates (is dominated by) the second distribution. denotes a non-conclusive test. ' * ' means significant at 95 %. Source: author's elaboration based on CNEF. first-period status matters (condition (i)), it comes out that we cannot establish a clear ranking between Germany and Switzerland. Whereas, when only second-period status (condition (ii)) we obtain that Germany clearly dominates Switzerland. When the focus is on absolute growth, conditions (i) and (ii) provide a different result in both Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. In particular, according to Proposition 1, when only second-period status matters (condition (ii)), Germany and Switzerland are dominated by Korea and US, whereas when first-period status matters (condition (i)) no clear ranking can be established between these countries. As for Proposition 2, it comes out that Germany is dominated by Korea and Switzerland is dominated by Korea, Germany and US according to condition (ii), while these rankings do not hold anymore according to condition (i). Most importantly, the different conclusions generated by Proposition 3 and 4, as concerned absolute growth, are insightful (see Table 9 , 10, 11, and 12 in the Empirical Appendix). It can be noticed that the dominance of Korea over Germany and Switzerland that is found in Proposition 4 is not confirmed in Proposition 3, although such dominance arises in condition (ii) of the latter.
This means that the extent of the difference in the evaluation of growth between Korea and Germany and Korea and Switzerland, when only final-period status matters, is such that it is able to compensate for the absence of difference in the evaluation of growth between these three countries that is found when initial-period status matters. Moreover, when there is social preference for the second period relative to the first one as the reference one to identify individuals, it is possible to rank the countries in two more cases (Korea over Germany and Switzerland) with respect to a situation in which more relevance is given to the first-period as the reference distribution.
We conclude our analysis by performing some robustness check related to variation in household composition. It might be argued that the results of our analysis are sensitive to changes in household composition between the initial (first) period and the second period of the growth process. Hence we recalculated our estimates using, for each growth process only the subsample of households which did not change in composition between the initial and second period. The results, reported in the empirical appendix, show that our conclusions are not affected. The framework outlined in the previous section could also be applied in the case one want to understand the dynamic of pro-poorness for a given country over time. To show this we analyze the growth dynamic or each country over the past decade, by comparing the performances of growth in the first period to the performances of growth in the second period. Unfortunately, for none of this countries we are able to state which period was more favorable than the other. This represents a weakness of our framework which directly derives on the trade-off between an increase in the robustness of the results and a decrease in the ability to make comparisons.
Conclusions
An increasing number of contributions in recent years has proposed alternative models to evaluate and rank growth processes that account for the identity of individuals, where the identity has been represented by their relative position in the pre-growth distribution of income. In this work
we have generalized this non-anonymous approach by providing a normative framework to rank growth processes that is robust to the choice of the reference period used to identify individuals.
In particular, we have adopted a bi-dimensional framework, where the two dimensions are respectively the rank of the individual in the income distribution of the reference period and the income change experienced by each individual. We have, then, provided partial dominance conditions for ordering growth processes and we have shown how they relate to the existing conditions in the literature.
We have used this framework to assess and rank the growth processes that took place in the last decade in five different countries: Australia, Germany, Korea, Switzerland, and US. Our results show that Australia, followed by Korea, arises to be the best performing country, while Germany and Switzerland arise to be the worst performing countries, when both initial and final period are relevant reference periods to identify individuals.
The results derived in our paper can be extended in a number of directions. First, new dominance conditions can be obtained if both property 2 and 3 (or property 2 and 4) are imposed on the same social evaluation function, such that it is possible to account for both 'progressive' concerns and time relevance concerns. The resulting dominance conditions would help to increase the possibility of ordering countries, although with the cost of further restricting the family of social evaluation functions to which such conditions would apply. Second, the framework proposed in this paper could be extended to endorse an intertemporal perspective, as recently explored in Bresson et al. (2015) , that does not simply compare in a non-anonymous fashion the initial and the final period but is able to account for the income and status variation of individuals between these two periods.
These extensions will be the object of future research.
Theoretical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We want to find sufficient and necessary conditions such that
v(p t )(δ A (p t )dp t − δ B (p t )dp t ) ≥ 0, f or allŴ
Letting ∆δ(p t )dp t = δ A (p t )dp t − δ B (p t )dp t and ∆δ(p t+1 )dp t+1 = δ A (p t+1 )dp t+1 − δ B (p t+1 )dp t+1 , rewrite eq. (17) as follows:
For the sufficiency part, by Property 1
For the necessity part, let ∆Ŵ ≥ 0, but assume that ∆δ(p t ) < 0 for some p t ∈ z(p)∆δ(p t )dp t ≤ 0 and
satisfy Property 1, now substituting in eq. (18) gives ∆Ŵ ≤ 0 which is a contradiction. QED
Proof of Proposition 2
For the sufficiency part, we integrate by parts eq. (19):
+v(p t+1 = 1)
Since by Property 1
∆δ(p t )dp t ≥ 0 and
∆δ(p t+1 )dp t+1 ≥ 0. Furthermore, by Property 2 v (p t ) ≤ 0 and v (p t+1 ) ≤ 0 for all
∆δ(q t )dq t ≤ 0 and
For the necessity part, let ∆Ŵ ≥ 0, but assume that pt 0 ∆δ(q t )dq t < 0 for some p t ∈ [0, 1] and that pt+1 0 ∆δ(p t+1 )dp t+1 < 0 for some p t+1 ∈ [0, 1]. Rewrite eq. (20) as follows:
. By Lemma 2 in Chambaz and Maurin (1998),
Hence, the second and fourth term of eq. (21) 
∆δ(p t+1 )dp t+1 < (25)
which results in ∆Ŵ < 0, a contradiction. QED Proof of Proposition 3.
Sufficiency can be shown as follows. First, reverse the order of integration and summation, such
Since by Property 1 and
, we can apply the Abel's
Lemma and obtain that 1] , implies that, integrating with respect to p t , Γ (p t ) dp t , where Γ (p t ) < 0, ∀p t ∈ I. Selecting a set of function Γ (p t ), such that Γ (p t ) −→ 0, ∀p t ∈ [0, 1] \ I, ∆Ŵ would reduce to b a Γ (p t ) dp t < 0, a contradiction. QED Proof of Proposition 4.
Before proving this proposition we need to state and prove the following lemma. Lemma 1. Proof For the sufficiency, note that
As for the necessity part, suppose that 
n j=i w j < 0, which is a contradiction. QED We want to find sufficient and necessary conditions such that
Sufficiency can be shown as follows. First, reverse the order of integration and summation, such that
Since by Property 1 v(p t ) ≥ 0 and v(p t+1 ) ≥ 0 ∀p t , p t+1 ∈ [0, 1], and by Property 4 v(p t+1 ) ≥ v(p t ), we can apply Lemma 1 and obtain that 1] , implies that, integrating with respect to p t , 1 0 T t=1 v (p t ) ∆δ (p t ) dp t ≥ 0. For the necessity the proof follows as in Proposition 3, suppose for a contradiction that ∆Ŵ ≥ 0, but there is a period τ ∈ {1, ..., T } and
Γ (p t ) dp t , where Γ (p t ) < 0, ∀p t ∈ I. Selecting a set of function Γ (p t ), such that Γ (p t ) −→ 0, ∀p t ∈ [0, 1] \ I, ∆Ŵ would reduce to b a Γ (p t ) dp t < 0, a contradiction. QED 8 Note that this is different from the Abel's Lemma, which states that a sufficient condition for All our indices and their differences are estimated on each replicate subsample S t (Y b ) and we denote it byβ
The standard error of the statisticβ b t is obtained as:
The lower and upper confidence bounds are the B * α/2 − th and B * (1 − α/2) − th ordered elements, respectively. For B = 1000 and α = 5% these are the 25th and 975th ordered elements of the empirical distribution F β t . Note: anonymity is expressed with respect to initial period status (panels on the left) and to final period status (panels on the right). Source: author' elaboration based on CNEF.
Detailed Results

